In this paper we characterize the optimal procurement mechanism and the investment level for an environment where two projects must be adjudicated sequentially, and the winner of the first project has the opportunity to invest in a distributional upgrade for its costs in the second project. We study 4 cases, based on the commitment level of the seller and the observability of the investment decision. We find that with commitment, the second period mechanism gives an advantage to the first period winner, and induces an investment level that is larger than the efficient one. With non-commitment, the second period mechanism gives a disadvantage to the first period winner, and induces an investment level that is smaller than the efficient one. Observability is irrelevant in the commitment case, but makes the effects more pronounced in the non-commitment case.
Introduction
During the last decades procurement auctions have been widely used as mechanisms to assign high cost projects concerning goods and services. By the year 1998, the sum of all governments expenditures in procurements (excluding defense and labor compensation) was estimated as 7.1% of the worldwide GDP 1 . The repeated utilization of procurement auctions by specific by governments and private institutions, which contract with the same pool of firms over time, has made the study of cost reduction investment by these firms specially relevant.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, to characterize the cost-minimizing procurement mechanisms in an environment with repeated interaction between a buyer and multiple sellers, where investment can be undertaken as a cost-reduction device, and also as an strategic action devised to obtain advantages in future procurement auctions. Second, to analyze the effects these cost-minimizing mechanisms have on the sellers' investment decisions. This is particularly relevant if the relative size of expected expenditures is big compared with the value of just one particular purchase, since in that case the use of tools that may reduce future costs, even at the cost of raising today's expenditures, can be particularly profitable.
We consider a buyer who wants to procure two consecutive projects and faces n ≥ 2 potential suppliers. Costs for performing both tasks are distributed independently across time and competitors, and they are private information to each firm. We assume, though, that the first procurement winner (whose identity is public information for the second procurement) acquires an intrinsic advantage characterized by a distributional upgrade. This reflects a knowledge acquired concerning the task performed, to which the rest of the firms have no access. Moreover, this upgrade can be influenced by a costly investment that the winner may carry out between the two procurements. In such a context, second period rules, through the degree of advantage they give to a first period winner, affect the benefits of such an investment, and therefore determine the investment carried out by the first period winner. As a consequence, the second period cost distribution of a first period winner, and the asymmetry between him and the first period losers, are determined endogenously.
We first consider the ex-post efficient benchmark: each period the project is assigned to the lowest cost supplier, and the investment level, I
e is such that the marginal cost of investment equals the marginal benefit (in expected terms) of cost reduction. We show that, independent of investment observability, such an incentive compatible mechanism exists and can be implemented through two second price sealed bid procurements.
We then use the mechanism design approach to characterize the cost-minimizing mechanism, which we determine under the assumptions of full commitment and non-commitment of the buyer.
In the first case, we assume that the rules for both mechanisms are decided at t=0, before any cost realization occurs. We show that the optimal mechanism is independent of investment observability, and gives an advantage gap to the first period winner in the second period. That is, he can win the second procurement auction even if his cost is higher than the minimum of the other competitors. Moreover, in this context, the investment level induced, I
* , is higher than the efficient level I e , so over-investment occurs. This result can seem counterintuitive, since an advantage gap can make the first period winner "relax", knowing he owns a big advantage over competitors and is likely to win anyway. However, there is a second effect that dominates: investment, by decreasing costs, increases the expected profits in case the firm gets the contract. Since with a bigger advantage gap this happens more often, the expected benefits due to cost reduction are higher, thus investment becomes more profitable.
In the non-commitment case, the second period rules are determined after the winner of the first period is announced and he has invested in cost reduction. We find that it is optimal for the buyer to give a disadvantage to the first period winner, who holds a distributional advantage over its competitors. Now, a first period winner does not necessarily wins the second period procurement even if he has the lowest cost among all competitors. This fact is anticipated by the first period winner, making investment less attractive and therefore leading to investment levels of cost-reduction below the efficient one. Here, the observability of investment makes a difference. When investment is not observable, the interaction between the buyer and the first period winner is equivalent to both agents simultaneously choosing mechanisms and investment levels, respectively. On the contrary, when investment can be monitored, the buyer optimally reacts with more disadvantageous mechanisms as the first period winner distribution improves. Thus, the first period winner invests less in this last case. Denoting by I and I the investment levels when investment is observable and non-observable we get I ≤ I < I e < I * These results have important implications. First, cost-minimizing buyers, with the ability to commit, and working in a dynamic environment, induce investment levels above the efficient level. This is because the second period advantages are not only introduced to encourage investment, but also to increase competition in the first period. In this respect, the buyer introduces inefficiencies to increase competition, in a similar way a static buyer introduces inefficiencies setting up a reservation cost. However, a buyer's lack of commitment induces under-investment, since the disadvantages to first period winners make cost reduction investment less attractive. Second, investment observability does not play a role in the case of full commitment, neither for efficiency nor for cost minimization. Here, the intuition from the moral hazard literature reappears: with risk-neutral agents, the first best level of investment (effort) can be induced. But now, this has a double interesting implication since the first best level of effort can be the efficient one and the one that minimizes cost for the seller, and both can be achieved. However, this result only holds at the optimum. We show in an example that, in the full commitment case, a sub-optimal second period mechanism leads to a seller's investment decision different from the one the seller would have chosen.
Finally, we derive some comparative statics with respect to the number of players. As it increases, all the investment levels mentioned above decrease, but weakly preserving the order among them. For a number of firms sufficiently large, the investment level in all environments collapses to zero: if the number of competitors is large enough, inducing investment is too expensive for the buyer relative to the marginal benefit in cost reduction. This is so because the added probability of the first period winner getting a cost lower than the minimum of all other competitors, decreases with the number of competitors. Nevertheless, under full commitment, although the advantage given to the first period winner at the last competition also decreases with the number of firms, it never disappears. This occurs because introducing sequentiality enables the buyer to distribute incentives inter-temporally in such a way that more competition is induced in the first procurement auction, which out-weights the second period inefficiencies regardless of the number of players.
Our work is related to the literature in several ways. With the methodology of mechanism design, Pesendorfer and Jofre-Bonnet in [9] , derive the cost minimizing mechanism for an exogenous level of complementarity (which is understood as an exogenous distributional change between both procurement auctions), full commitment and two players. We extend this result to allow for investment (and therefore endogenous complementarity), non-commitment and multiple players. In a non-commitment setting, Luton and McAfee [5] determined the optimal mechanism for a particular type of exogenous distributional upgrade.
The possibility of achieving efficiency has been analyzed for the case when investment can be carried out before a procurement auction with a fixed mechanism (first or second price) takes place. An affirmative answer is found in Piccione and Tan [10] when firms are ex-ante symmetric, they can all invest non observably and the technology presents diminishing returns to scale. Dasgupta [2] , in a similar model (investment stage and non observability), but with a buyer with lack of commitment, shows that investment level is below the efficient one. Moreover, commitment rises the investment level, but always below efficiency.
Finally, Arozamena and Cantillon in [1] , analyze the effects of allowing only one firm to invest before a first price sealed bid procurement auction, and make this action observable by competitors. Their main result is the existence of under-investment: as a response to the cost-reduction investment, rival firms will bid more aggressively, therefore reducing the investment incentives. In our paper, we also get under-investment, but for a different reason: under non-commitment, it is the mechanism designer (the buyer) that changes behavior, giving an advantage to worse firms, and therefore decreasing the incentives to invest.
The Model

The Environment
Consider a risk-neutral buyer who wants to procure two projects, one at t = 1 and the other at t = 2. The set of competing sellers is N = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, all of which are risk-neutral and live for the two periods. The buyer is compelled to procure the two goods or services 2 . In each period, the cost of undertaking the project for a seller is drawn from the interval C = [c,c], and it is private information. At t = 1, these costs are independently distributed according to a distribution F (·), differentiable, that satisfies f (c) ≡ F (c) > 0 if c ∈ C (so sellers are ex-ante symmetric).
At t = 2, the competitors costs are drawn independently from those drawn in period 1, and independently across sellers as well. The costs of the first period losers are taken from the same distribution F (·). Instead, the winner of the first procurement (from now on the winner ) has the option of investing an amount I between auctions, at a monetary cost Ψ(I), and changes his distribution to G(·, I), differentiable with ∂G ∂c (c, I) > 0 and with the same support. Assumption 1 below implies a distribution improvement for the winner as a function of investment: investment implies an increase in the chance of obtaining lower costs relative to higher ones. As a consequence, higher investment induces a "better" cost distribution in the usual sense of first order stochastic dominance. The formal result is in lemma 9 in the next section.
∂G ∂c (c, I) The first inequality, when evaluated at I = 0 indicates that there can exist an exogenous improvement for the first period winner. He acquires a knowledge concerning the task performed (the know-how ), which is not available to the losers. The second inequality shows that the final degree of complementarity will depend on the amount the seller invests in developing this know-how. We also impose that the marginal benefit of investment is decreasing:
We now state two technical assumptions, the first one is the increasing hazard rate, and the second is a condition needed for integrability.
Assumption 3
are increasing in c. Also,
Finally, for the investment technology we assume, as usual, that is increasing and convex.
Assumption 5 Ψ(·) is twice differentiable and satisfies
2 This is equivalent to assume that the cost for the buyer of carrying out the project himself is C 0 = +∞.
The previous assumptions are not hard to satisfy. For example, the family of distributions introduced in Piccione and Tan [10] , which they argue is a way of modeling investment in cost reduction of R&D technologies, satisfies them.
Example 6 Suppose that F (·) is a twice differentiable concave distribution. Then, it is straightforward that verifies the regularity assumption. The family of distributions given by
satisfies assumptions 1 and 2, 3, and 4 (see Appendix for a proof ).
For notation purposes, we denote the joint density of the first-period distribution as f
and
The Mechanisms
The fact that costs are drawn independently across time enables the buyer to pay attention only to incentive compatible mechanisms because the revelation principle holds. We will focus on two types of environments: full commitment and non-commitment of the buyer. In the first case, the buyer can commit to the first and second period mechanisms before any cost realization takes place. In the second, he cannot, and he chooses the second period rules after the identity of the first period winner is known and the investment level has been selected.
In each case, we analyze the cases when investment is observable and when it is not. The difference is that in the observable case, the investment, and therefore the winner's cost distribution for the second period is public information. Thus, in this setting the mechanisms used by the buyer at t = 2 may depend on the level of investment chosen by the winner of the first procurement auction.
We consider second period procurement mechanisms that are history dependent only to the extent that they depend on the identity of the first period winner, but not on the cost realization (revelation) of that first period. Moreover, we do not allow the buyer to exclude sellers in the second period if they do not participate in the first. Notice, however, that more general mechanisms can decrease the seller's expected cost. An extreme example of this is the threat of non-participation in the second period. With this strategy, the first period payments can be increased in the amount of the expected utility in the second period mechanism, allowing the seller to fully extract the second period surplus. Such mechanisms seem unrealistic and seldom used in practice, probably because of the inability of sellers to commit to such a strong and ex-post inefficient punishments.
From now on, we define ∆ n = (
x i = 1 the unit simplex. If investment is observable and the amount of it chosen by the first period winner is I, we will use subscript (w, I) when we refer to this player at t = 2. Analogously, we will use subscript (l, I, i) at t = 2 if player i ∈ N was a first period loser (if investment can't be observed, we drop the subscript I). Using the previous notations, we have: Definition 7 A direct mechanism, when investment is not observable, is given by the tuple
Definition 8 A direct mechanism, when investment is observable, is given by the tuple
where (c) the probability that competitor i ∈ N wins the procurement auction at time s = 1, 2 conditional on the same cost report. Finally, when investment can be monitored, the functions are essentially the same, but now the second period rules may depend on the investment level carried out by the first period winner.
A natural question that arises is whether the mechanism designer can improve by using mechanisms with additional features. For instance, the buyer can make use of second period rules which depend on the first period winner's identity. In a companion paper ( [3] ) we show that there is no improvement, in terms of reducing buyer's expected expenditures, when such history-dependent mechanisms are taken into account (because of ex-ante symmetry). We therefore restrict our analysis to the mechanisms considered in definitions 7 and 8.
Preliminary Results
We now state a well-known result involving some consequences of assumption 1. In particular, that the monotone likelihood ratio property implies first order stochastic dominance as the investment level decreases.
Lemma 9 Suppose that assumption 1 holds, then:
, ∀ c ∈ C, 0 ≤ I < I .
(iii) For every c ∈ C fixed, the function G(c, ·) is increasing. This is equivalent to first order stochastic dominance as I decreases in the family of distributions {G(·, I)| I ≥ 0}.
Proof : Standard.
We denote by Q 1 i (c i ), player i's expected probability of winning the first period procurement auction if his announcement is c i and the other players are telling the truth. Analogously we denote by T 1 i (c i ), player i's expected transfer if his announcement is c i and the other players are telling the truth:
In the case of investment observability, expected probabilities, if the investment level carried out by the first period winner is I, are given by:
with expected transfers T 
Finally, we denote by Π 1 i,I (c i , c i ) the discounted expected utility at t = 1 for seller i with cost c i that declares c i , conditional on truth-telling at t = 2.
This last expression consists in expected payments and costs of the first procurement (the first two terms), and the ones related to the second period expected utility (which depends on being the winner or a loser in the first period).
As we said before, we can restrict the analysis to direct mechanisms. Truth-telling in the second period can be written as:
And for the first period it can be written as:
Observation: We have defined second period rules (transfers and probabilities) and incentive compatibility constraints for any possible investment level I ≥ 0. However, the only relevant investment level is the one the buyer wants to induce. The rules for any other I can be set-up such that those investment levels are never selected, and IC is satisfied trivially. This allows us to see mechanisms when investment is observable as a tuple (Γ, I), where I is the investment level "forced" upon the first period winner and Γ specifies second period rules for that particular I (and also first period rules).
When investment is not observable, second period rules can't depend on investment level I. In this setting, the rules (q 
The first condition requires that the the investment level chosen by the first period winner must maximize his utility level conditional on second period rules. Although we do not write subscript I in all the inequalities, it implicitly appears in the second period expected utility of the first period losers and in the first period utility of all players, through the function G(c, I). We omit the mentioned variable just to emphasize that the buyer can make no use of this more general mechanisms when investment is non-observable.
In the next lemma we state the usual characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms:
Lemma 10 (Incentive Compatibility): Γ is incentive compatible if and only if
Proof: See Appendix. Participation constraints depend on the level of commitment and investment observability analyzed, and will be discussed in the sections where optimal mechanisms are characterized.
Efficiency
An ex-post efficient mechanism assigns, in each period, the project to the lowest cost supplier and induces an investment level such that the marginal cost of investment equals the marginal benefit (in expected terms) of cost reduction. We prove the existence of such a mechanism regardless of investment observability. This is not obvious: since the mechanism must assign each project to the lowest cost supplier, the investment level (in the non-observable case) is automatically defined by equation (8) and not necessarily the buyer's desired one. We prove nonetheless, that the level chosen by the seller in such a mechanism is exactly the one the buyer would like to induce. We will use this investment level as a benchmark to be compared with the investment levels induced by the cost minimizing mechanisms in the different environments.
Since the efficient mechanism, that we denote by Γ e , must assign each project to the competitor with the lowest cost, the assignment rules are given by:
for t = 1, 2, i ∈ N . Given this rules, and if the first period winner invests a quantity I, the expected social cost is
Therefore, the efficient investment level, I e , is the solution to
In the next result we characterize I e and find a mechanism that achieves efficiency regardless of investment observability.
Proposition 11 The efficient investment level I
e is the solution to
Moreover, it can be induced regardless of investment observability using second price sealed bid procurement auctions.
Proof : See Appendix.
In equation (9) we can see that there are costs and benefits associated to investment. On the one hand, investment must be paid for (first term). On the other, there is an expected cost reduction due to one competitor having a better distribution (second term) 3 . To conclude this section, notice that the irrelevance of investment observability is due to risk neutrality. The choice of rules and investment level just described is equivalent to the one made by a buyer who is able to observe suppliers' costs (that is, a situation where adverse selection effects are shut down). From this perspective, the investment level decision correspond to the effort level chosen by the agent in a risk neutral principal-agent model, and it is widely known that the first best solution can be achieved when effort is not observable under the risk neutrality assumption.
Revenue Maximization Under Full Commitment
In this environment we assume the existence of institutions that may enforce the contracts established by the buyer. He commits, before any cost realization, to rules for the first and second period procurement mechanisms. Second period rules can give different conditions to the first period winner and losers, and can depend on the investment level when it is observable. However, if a seller decides not to participate in the first period, we assume the buyer does not have enough commitment power to guarantee he will not have access to the second period mechanism and treated just as a first period loser. This last point is important (as it will be explained when we discuss the participation constraints), and very plausible. Even if a buyer could commit to this rule, a first period buyer could change the name of his firm and ask for acceptance in the second period, making it impossible for a seller to leave him out without being accused of partiality.
We first characterize the cost minimizing mechanism with investment observability. We find that it gives an advantage to the first period winner and that this advantage is independent of the level of investment required. This, in turn, induces over-investment by the first period winner. Then we turn to the case of non-observable investment. We find that the optimal mechanism remains unchanged: the level of investment chosen by the first period winner is the same the buyer would have chosen if he could observe it.
Investment Observability and Full Commitment
In this context, since investment is observable, the buyer can induce any amount of investment he wants. This can be done by setting transfers low enough (even payments to the buyer) so that any other level chosen by the first period winner is unprofitable for him. Under this schemes, histories associated to other investment levels never happen. Therefore, we assume the buyer chooses the investment level I ≥ 0.
Participation in the second period is ensured by
At t = 1, we require participation in both procurements auctions to be more profitable (in expected terms) than doing it only in the last one (as in Pesendorfer and Jofre-Bonet [9] ). The justification for this comes from the fact the buyer cannot commit to exclude a player who did not participate in the first period mechanism from the second period one. 4 Therefore, the first period participation constraint can be written as 5 :
We are now ready to state the optimization problem faced by the mechanism designer. Denote by C(Γ, I) the expected procurement cost when the buyer chooses a mechanism Γ and an investment level I. It corresponds to:
Therefore, this buyer solves:
The following result shows that the cost minimizing mechanism under investment observability satisfies: (i) In the first period it assigns the contract to the lowest virtual cost seller, (ii) Second period rules give an advantage to the first period winner, but that advantage does not depend on the investment level chosen by the buyer.
Theorem 12
Under full commitment and investment observability, the cost minimizing mechanism, Γ * , does not depend on the investment level chosen by the buyer, and it is characterized by
with k(c) = c + 1
Proof : See Appendix. 4 If the seller could do it, he could extract all the expected seller's rent from the second period. He could ask for them as extra payments in the first period and threaten with the impossibility of participation in the second period for sellers who are not willing to comply. 5 By subscript "o" we denote the investment observability setting.
At t = 1 the optimal rules correspond to the ones derived by Myerson in [8] , and are efficient because of the ex-ante symmetry of competitors and assumption 3. However, the first period winner obtains an advantage gap for the second procurement, that is, he can obtain the second contract even when some rivals have lower costs, so the cost minimizing rule in the second period sacrifices efficiency to reduce expected costs. This advantage gap decreases with the number of sellers: as the number of competitors increases, giving an advantage to the first period winner is more expensive, since it is more likely that one of the first period losers has the lowest cost. Nevertheless, this gap never disappears, showing that sequentiality introduces memory in the optimal contract, expressed in the aforementioned advantage gap.
Observation 1: Since these rules do not depend on the level of investment I, they are also feasible when this variable is not observable.
Observation 2:
The rule defined in the previous theorem, and the procedure to obtain it, does not rely on the ex-ante degree of complementarity (given by G(c, 0)) nor on the ex-post degree of complementarity (given by G(c, I)). This occurs because the buyer is able to inter-temporally distribute incentives across time in a better way than performing two independent procurements. In order to increase the competition in the first period, rules for the second period are modified. Notice that this happens even when the number of seller goes to infinity.
To complete our characterization of the cost-minimizing mechanism, we now characterize the investment level chosen by the buyer, I
* .
Theorem 13
Under full commitment of the buyer and investment observability, the cost minimizing investment level I * is the solution to
Proof: See Appendix.
In the previous expression we can see the the two effects of investment. The first term is the cost of investment (at t = 2 the buyer must ensure participation for the first period winner), the second one reflects the advantages of it: as investment goes up G(c, I) goes up, since more weight is put in low-cost realizations of the first period winner. However, when compared to the efficiency case (equation 9), this last effect is stronger. Because now the first period winner is granted an advantage gap at the second procurement, it happens that k −1 (c) < c which implies
The benefits of investment for the buyer are now larger, since the first period winner is assigned the contract more often, due to the advantage gap. From now on we assume that the first order condition in (14) is satisfied.
Investment Non-Observability and Full Commitment
As we said before, in this case rules cannot be functions of the investment level chosen by the first period winner. He decides, knowing the second period rules, how much to invest. Therefore, the second period rules chosen by the buyer influence the investment decision, and this effect must be taken into account by the buyer. With all this in mind, we can write the buyer's problem as 6 :
6 By subscript "no" we denote the investment non-observability environment. Recall that in this case the rules chosen by the buyer are not functions of investment.
no (I) The first restriction must be added because the investment level is chosen by the first period winner. It specifies that the cost minimizing investment level that the buyer wishes to be implemented must be profit maximizing under mechanism Γ no for the first period winner.
Denote by (Γ * no , I * no ) the solution to P no . It is clear that
due to the additional restrictions in P no . The next result establishes that the mechanism (Γ * , I * ), optimal when investment is observable, is also feasible when investment is non-observable. This is so not only because Γ * has second period rules that do not depend on investment, but also because I * , under this rules, is profit maximizing for the first period winner. So, it satisfies IC no .
Proposition 14 Under full commitment of the buyer and investment non-observability, the solution to P no is Γ * no = Γ * , I * no = I * , with (Γ * , I * ), the solution with investment observability.
Therefore, as (Γ * , I * ) is the solution in both settings, observable and non-observable investment, we call it the full commitment cost-minimizing solution. We can see that when the buyer set rules according to Γ * , he provides the right incentives to induce the first period winner to invest I * , the same level that the buyer would have chosen himself. Therefore, the intuition from the moral hazard literature reappears even with all the elements of adverse selection present in this environment: with risk-neutral agents, the buyer can induce exactly the level of investment desired, without changing the mechanism he would have chosen if he himself had to select the investment level.
Over-Investment
Under full commitment, the buyer gives an advantage to the first period winner in the second period. Surprisingly, this induces an investment level that is above the efficient one, as shown in the next result.
Proposition 15 Assume that I e and I * satisfy the first order conditions of problems (9) and (14), respectively. Thus, if the buyer is fully committed over-investment occurs, that is, I
e < I * .
The intuition for this result depends on the degree of investment observability. If investment is nonobservable, two effects are present. On the one hand the second period advantage gap gives the first period winner incentives to relax, and to invest less in a distributional upgrade, since he does not really need a low cost to win and investment is costly. On the other hand, investment generates lower expected costs, increasing his profit margin in case of winning. As the advantage gap increases, winning becomes more likely and therefore investment becomes more attractive. This second effect dominates the first.
To see this, we can rewrite the conditions that define I e and I * ( (9) and (14)) as
The first term in both equations corresponds to the fraction of the first period winner's expected payoff in the second period that depends on investment. In both cases, this term increases with I, because G(c, ·) is increasing. But since k −1 (c) < c, this effect is bigger in the full-commitment cost-minimizing case. This shows how the incentives to relax are dominated by the incentives to invest and increase the profit margins. Moreover, this effect is quite strong. Consider two mechanismsΓ andΓ, not depending on investment, such that the corresponding second period expected winning probability functions for the first period winner satisfyQ If investment is observable, and thus chosen by the buyer, the result is the same but the intuition is different. If the first period winner is going to have an advantage in the second period, and therefore he is likely to win anyway, it is good for the buyer to increase the likelihood of him having low costs. This effect makes investment more attractive than in the case of efficient second period rules (which give no advantage), and therefore over-investment occurs.
Revenue Maximization Under Non-Commitment
In this environment we assume that the buyer cannot commit to the second period rules before the investment stage, and this is known by the sellers. This fact induces, through a second period mechanism that is disadvantageous to the first period winner, an investment level below the efficient one. Also, in this setting, the observability of investment will make a difference (unlike the commitment case).
To begin with, suppose that the first period winner invests an amount I before the second procurement. Now, the buyer has incentives to change rules based on the investment level, and considers the investment expenditures, Ψ(I), as sunk costs.
We start with the case of observable investment.
Investment Observability and Non-Commitment
Because investment is observable, the buyer can make use of mechanisms of the form
It is worth to emphasize that because of the buyer's inability to commit to mechanisms, he cannot decide the investment level even though it is observable.
Since participation in the second period must give non-negative profits, it must be the case that the participation constraint can be written as:
Finally, as in the previous sections, the second procurement expected cost corresponds to
If the first period winner has already chosen an investment level I (observable), sequential rationality implies that the buyer solves, for the second period:
The following result shows that, given any investment level carried out by the first period winner, the buyer gives disadvantage to this agent at t = 2. Since the buyer cannot commit to contracts and the first period winner has improved his distribution, the buyer has no incentive to continue giving the mentioned advantage gap of the full commitment solution. As usual, informational asymmetries harm the competitor with the best distribution in one-shot auctions.
Lemma 16 In the absence of buyer's commitment, the second period cost minimizing mechanism Γ 2 (I), when the investment observed is I, corresponds to < min
, min
The second period mechanism gives a disadvantage to the first period winner, since c +
, ∀I ≥ 0 (Lemma 9, (ii)). Thus, it can occur that the first period winner loses even if he has the lowest cost. We can see how an opportunistic behavior appears, exactly as in a hold-up situation. The first period winner commits to a sunk cost investment to improve his cost distribution, allowing the seller to take advantage of this specific investment. The buyer does so by changing the rules against the first period winner, and therefore extracting more rent from him.
The next result characterizes the optimal first period mechanism under non-commitment. The assumption of sequential rationality directly implies that these rules must be optimal in a one-shot procurement auction setting. Therefore, the buyer should compare virtual costs in order to assign the first period project.
Corollary 17 In the absence of buyer's commitment, the first period cost minimizing assignment rules correspond to
Proof : Direct.
We now turn to the investment level induced in this environment. A first period winner, anticipating the buyer's behavior in the second period (the selection of mechanisms of the form Γ 2 (I)), determines how much to invest. This allows us to fully characterize the investment level:
Proposition 18 With non-commitment and investment observability, the investment level chosen by the first period winner, I, solves
with J I (c) = c + f (c) . Thus, the optimal mechanism for the buyer is Γ 2 ( I).
We can see how investment affects V (·) through three channels. The first term in the integral, [1 − F (J −1 (J I (c))] n−1 , decreases with I, since as investment increases, the second period mechanism gives a bigger disadvantage to the first period winner. The last term, −Ψ(I), also reflects a negative effect of investment, since it is costly. However, the second term in the integral, G(c, I) is increasing in I for each c ∈ C, and it reflects the increased probability of winning due to a better cost distribution.
If we compare condition (19) with condition (9), that defines the efficient level of investment, we observe that the positive effect of investment (given by an increase in G(c, I)) is weaker in the case of non-commitment, since
n−1 7 . Using assumption 1, lemma 9 (ii), and assumption 3 we have that
Intuitively, in an ex-post efficient mechanism, the probability of a first period winner succeeding at t = 2 is the probability that all first period losers have higher costs ([1 − F (c)]
n−1 ). On the other hand, his probability of winning in a non-commitment environment is the probability that all losers have higher virtual costs than him ([1−F (J −1 (J I (c))] n−1 ). This last probability is lower since virtual costs are higher when the cost distribution is improved.
The fact that the absence of commitment reduces the advantage granted to the first period winner at the second procurement (when compared to the efficient mechanism) will induce a lower investment level chosen by this agent, as shown in the next result:
Proposition 19 Assume that I e , I * and I satisfy the first order conditions of problems, (9), (14)and (19), respectively. Then, under non-commitment of the buyer and investment observability, investment falls below efficiency, that is I < I e < I * .
Here, a hold-up intuition appears: anticipating that the rules will be biased against him in the second procurement mechanism, and knowing this effect will be more pronounced the more he invests, the seller invests less than the efficient level. In other words, he does not internalize all the benefits from investment, since part of it is appropriated by the seller as rent extraction.
Investment Non-Observability and Non-Commitment
We now consider the case when investment is not observable. If the buyer could monitor the investment level chosen by the first period winner, I, he would react optimally imposing Γ 2 (I), as in the previous subsection. Now, since investment cannot be observed, the buyer cannot choose a contingent plan with one mechanism for each level I selected by the first period winner.
We model this situation as a simultaneous-move game between the first period winner and the buyer where the former chooses an investment level and the latter a second period mechanism. In such a game, the buyer chooses just one mechanism, which is a best response to the investment level chosen by the first period winner. Symmetrically, the investment level is a best response to the mechanism chosen by the buyer.
Rigourously, we define the action space for the first period winner to be
For the buyer, the strategy space could be the set of incentive compatible mechanisms that satisfy participation constraints. However, by a rationalizability argument, we consider only the mechanisms that are a best response for some investment level of the first period winner, that is
where Γ(I) is the sequentially optimal mechanism given an investment level I defined in lemma 16. In this context we can define a pure strategy equilibrium:
Definition 20 A pure strategy equilibrium under non-commitment and investment non-observability is a tuple (Γ, I) ∈ A b × A w such that
where Π 2 w,Γ (c, c) is the second period expected utility of a first period winner with cost c that reveals truthfully under the mechanism Γ. Condition (i) implies that the mechanism chosen by the buyer is a best response to the investment level chosen by the first period winner. Condition (ii), respectively, implies that given the mechanism Γ, the first period winner is choosing his investment level optimally. We now state a simple lemma that allows to proceed with the characterization of the investment level and the optimal mechanism.
Lemma 21 A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is given by ( I, Γ( I)) where
The function U (K, I) corresponds to the second period expected utility for the first period winner if he invests an amount K and faces the mechanism Γ 2 (I). If we compare the function U (·, I) with the function V (·) defined in proposition 18, which characterizes investment for the case of observability, we can see that the negative effect of investment due to more disadvantageous mechanisms is fixed. The reason is that the buyer cannot observe the investment level chosen by the first period winner. However, the positive effect corresponding to an increased probability of winning and the negative effect corresponding to the cost of investment are still present. Since one of the negative effects of investment is fixed, the incentives to invest are now bigger than in the investment observability case.
The following proposition ensures the existence of an equilibrium, under the assumption that the marginal benefit due to a distributional improvement disappears when the investment level carried out is large enough. It also states that under non-commitment of the buyer, the possibility to monitor investment induces levels below the ones chosen when investment cannot be observed. This occurs because, when investment is observable, the buyer can react optimally with more disadvantageous mechanisms as investment increases.
Proposition 22 Suppose that the following condition holds
8 :
Then, a unique equilibrium exists and corresponds to the tuple ( I, Γ( I)) where the investment level I is given by condition (20).
Also, I ≤ I, with strict inequality if I satisfies the first order condition of problem (19).
We can also compare this investment level with the efficient one. 8 The family of distributional upgrades introduced in example 1 satisfies this condition.
Corollary 23
If I e satisfies the first order condition of problem (9), then,
The intuition of the result is the following: disadvantageous mechanisms disincentive cost-reduction investment. This is so because the marginal benefit of investment (which comes from the expected cost reduction in the second period) decreases when the second period rules become less attractive (since they give a disadvantage to the first period winner). This occurs in both the case of investment observability and non-observability. However, this effect is less marked when the buyer cannot observe the investment level and must choose a mechanism "guessing" the first period winner's decision. If he can observe the investment level, he can react optimally and choose even more disadvantageous mechanisms in the second period. This fact is anticipated by the first period winner, which results in lower investment levels.
To conclude, note that the assumption of sequential rationality implies that the optimal first period rules in this environment correspond to the ones defined in Corollary 17. As before, the first period transfers are set-up such that participation is ensured for all sellers at both competitions. As a consequence, the cost minimizing mechanisms under non-commitment (for observable and non-observable investment) are feasible for a fully committed buyer. Therefore, the expected cost in an environment without commitment is necessarily higher than in an environment with commitment Corollary 24 The expected cost of both procurements is lower under full commitment than under noncommitment of the buyer (whether investment is observable or not).
Discussion
Investment Observability "Irrelevancy"
The fact that investment observability cannot improve the buyer's ability to reduce expected costs (in the case of full commitment) is interesting. Moreover, this is also the case when the buyer's objective is ex-post efficiency, since the ex-post efficient stage mechanisms induce the efficient investment level. A natural question that arises is whether this is true for any mechanism used by the buyer. The answer is no, as shown in the next result. When the buyer sets, for instance, a mechanism that gives less advantage to the first period winner than the one in the cost-minimizing mechanism, the investment level chosen by the buyer (in the observable case) is higher than the one chosen by the first period winner (in the non-observable case). The intuition is as follows: with a smaller second period advantage, second period rules are closer to a sequentially optimal mechanism. Therefore the buyer captures more of the surplus generated by a cost distribution improvement 9 and, consequently has a bigger marginal benefit from investment. It is not surprising, then, that if he chooses investment, he will select a level above the one a first period winner would choose.
Proposition 25 Consider n = 2 and assume that the buyer wants to implement the following incentive compatible mechanism:q with g(·) an increasing function that satisfies g(c) = c and
with strict inequality on a subset of C with non-zero measure. Denote byĨ b andĨ w the investment levels chosen by the buyer and first period winner respectively when facing this mechanism. Then,Ĩ b >Ĩ w
Number of Competitors
Let n ∈ IN and I * (n) the full commitment investment level when there are n competitors and C * (n) the corresponding expected cost of both procurement auctions. The following proposition shows two results. First, as the number of competitors increases, the investment level decreases to 0 as n goes to infinity. Second, the expected cost of both procurement auctions tend to 2c as n goes to infinity.
Proposition 26 Suppose that I * (n) is the full commitment investment level when there are n competitors. Then, I * (n) 0 as n → ∞. As a consequence, I e (n), I(n) and I(n) go to zero as n → ∞. Finally, if we denote by C * (n) the expected cost of both procurement auctions under full commitment, we have that C * (n) → 2c as n → ∞.
The intuition behind the first result is the following: as the number of competitors grows, giving an advantage in the second period mechanism becomes more costly. This is so because there is a higher probability that the lowest cost supplier will not win the procurement, and this increases the expected cost of an advantage. If investment is observable (and therefore chosen by the buyer), this smaller advantage reduces the incentives to induce cost reduction, because it is less likely that the first period winner will also win the second procurement. If investment is non-observable (and therefore chosen by the first period winner), then a reduced advantage in the second period decreases his incentives to invest. This effect is compounded with the fact that any advantage level becomes less significant as the number players grows. Even if the first period winner has an advantage, the probability that another seller draws a significantly lower cost and still beats him becomes more important when the number of competitors grows. Such and advantage exists even when n goes to infinity, (see section 5), but then it is just nominal. As the number of competitors goes to infinity, the probability that the first period winner is assigned the second contract despite a higher cost converges to 0.
As we can see, when the intensity of competition increases, the role of mechanisms as tools to induce investment and intertemporally redistribute incentives disappears. The only significant role played by the cost minimizing mechanism is to assign efficiently in each period.
The second result is direct from the fact that, as the number of sellers increases, it is more likely that some of the competitors reports a cost close to c in each procurement auction. Moreover, the probability that the lowest cost supplier is not assigned the project goes to 0, and therefore competition drives the cost of each project to c.
Conclusions
In this paper we characterized the cost minimizing mechanism for a buyer that must procure two projects and faces the same group of competitors over time. We considered the cases of full-commitment and noncommitment to second period rules, and observable and non-observable investment carried out by the first period winner. Moreover, we characterized the investment level induced in each of these environments.
We first defined, as a benchmark, an ex-post efficient mechanism, which always assigns the projects to the lowest-cost seller, and induces an investment level such that the social cost of investment is equal to the social gain of it. We proved the existence of a such a mechanism independently of investment observability.
We proved that, if the buyer can commit to second period mechanisms, he will choose to give an advantage to the first period winner in order to increase the intensity of competition in the first period. This advantage, which is ex-post inefficient, decreases with the number of competitors but never disappears. This is so because, for small advantages, the gains from the intertemporal distribution of incentives are always bigger than the losses due to ex-post inefficiency. This pressure to increase competition in the first period and its consequence, the advantage in the second period for first period winner, induces investment levels above the socially efficient one. We also showed that in the case of full-commitment, the observability of investment is irrelevant and the optimal mechanism remains the same.
In the case of a buyer who lacks commitment, he chooses second period mechanisms that are disadvantageous to the first period winner. This, in turn, induces investment levels below efficiency.
Here, investment observability makes a difference, since the buyer chooses more disadvantageous rules as for bigger investment levels. If he can observe investment, and react optimally, this effect is stronger and anticipated by the first period winner, therefore inducing even lower investment levels than in the non-observable case, where he must anticipate the choice of the first period winner.
In this paper mechanisms help the buyer to reduce costs through three channels. They allow rent extraction in a single period, they allow the provider to intertemporally distribute incentives (through advantages) and they give incentives to investment. Without commitment, since only a disadvantage is credible in the second period, the second channel disappears and, moreover, investment incentives are small. As a result of this, commitment helps the buyer to reduce costs, since it gives him more tools for rent extraction and, by allowing him to induce higher levels of investment, it reduces the total expected cost of the project.
The present work gives interesting normative implications for an agency that must procure projects repeatedly over time. It stresses the value of commitment and the role of second period advantages as incentives for cost-reduction investment. The extension to a general multi-period model is not direct, however. In such a model, there is not only one "winner", since many sellers could have won a previous procurement auction. A mechanism should specify how a relative advantage is calculated, and how previously won auctions influence this advantage. Moreover, it is critical to decide who can invest at each point in time. If more than one seller can do it, the analysis of this paper must be generalized to allow simultaneous cost-distribution improvements. We leave this as a direction for future work in the topic.
It is straightforward that the first inequality in assumption 1 is checked when I = 0. Also, it is clear that
Now, setting 0 ≤ I < I and c < c, simple algebra shows that the second inequality in assumption 1 is equivalent to (1 − G(c, 0))
which is obviously true since c < c. Assumption 2 holds since
is increasing in c. This is equivalent to
so, it suffices to show that
the result follows.
Proof Lemma 10:
is a maximum of linear functions, it follows that it is convex, and therefore differentiable a.e. It is easy to see that the following are equivalent: (a) The mechanism is incentive compatible (b)
for all i and k = 1, 2. We now prove the two implications required. For the sufficiency, notice that −Q k i (c i ) is non-decreasing since it is a selection from the subdifferential of a convex function (see [11] 
For the necessity, notice that
and the mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof Proposition 11:
First note that the efficient mechanism plus the ex-ante complementarity assumption ensure the participation for all players at both procurement auctions. Participation at t = 2 is induced by scaling-up transfers as usual. For the first competition, assume the investment level chosen by the buyer is I ≥ 0. Thus, the following must hold: ∀i ∈ N , ∀c ∈ C with
Then I e is the solution to
Integrating by parts,
The first term vanishes. Replacing this expression in the problem just mentioned we obtain
and because the first term does not depends on I we conclude that I e is the solution to
concluding the first part. For the last one, recall that under a second price sealed bid auction there are no incentive compatibility problems since truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In the first period, transfers are scaled-up by a constant such that participation in both competitions is ensured for all players (note that incentive compatibility holds). Since each project is assigned to the least-cost competitor, in the second period the expected probability function for the first period winner is Q and, as a consequence, I e will be selected as well. Therefore, I e is achieved in a context of full commitment regardless of investment observability.
Proof Theorem 12: Assume that the buyer wants to induce an investment level I and that Γ(I) is incentive compatible. Rearranging terms in (5), (6), (7) and using Lemma 10 we obtain: 
Then, integrating by parts 
with
Replacing this last expressions in (10) yields a procurement cost of 
Since the second and fifth term cancel each other we get
Without loss of generality, because of the ex-ante symmetry across players, the buyer pay attention only to mechanisms that satisfy Q
Otherwise, there exist another mechanism with modified first-period rules with the same expected procurement cost (see the working paper [3] ). Therefore, total expected cost reduces to
Noting that at the optimum
Now add and subtract the last and first term respectively. We obtain
Since in an optimal mechanism, T 
Pointwise maximization yields the following rules
f (c) . Finally, because this last function and c+
f (c) are increasing (assumption 3), the expected probability functions in each period are non increasing. If transfers are computed according to Lemma 10, the mechanism is incentive compatible and no participation constraint is violated. Because this mechanism is optimal regardless of the investment level the buyer may want to induce, it is also optimal for P o . This concludes the proof.
Proof Theorem 13:
Recall that under full commitment and investment observability the rules defined by Γ * minimize the expected cost of both projects for any level of investment I ≥ 0 chosen by the first period winner. Thus, in this case, to obtain the optimal level of investment for the buyer, I
* , we replace the mentioned mechanism in the procurement cost expression and minimize with respect to I. Remember that, at the optimum of this problem, the expected procurement cost can be written as (see expression (36) in the proof of theorem 12)
Then, in order to obtain the optimal investment level, the buyer solves
It can be easily checked that
are the expected probabilities of winning the second project for a winner and any loser respectively, conditional on the report c. Then, integrating by parts,
Using t = k −1 (c) in the last integral and replacing k(c) = c + 1
Also, we have that
Only the second term of the last expression depends on I, so the level of investment that minimizes the expected cost under full observability and commitment is the solution to
Proof Proposition 14: Since (Γ * , I * ), defined by expressions (11), (12) and ( 
Since I * satisfies the same optimization problem, we conclude that (Γ * no , I * no ) is incentive compatible, and therefore feasible for the non-observable case. It is obvious that C(Γ * , I * ) ≤ C(Γ * no , I * no ), so the feasibility of (Γ * , I * ) for the non-observable case implies that C(Γ * no , I * no ) = C(Γ * , I * ).
Proof Proposition 15:
We assume that I e and I * satisfy their corresponding first order conditions. Since l(·) is increasing and l(c) > c, we
which yields I e < I * using
∂I 2 (c, I) < 0 and Ψ's convexity.
Proof Proposition 16: Suppose the first period winner had invested an amount I. It is easy to see that the second procurement expected cost corresponds to
Therefore, the second period cost-minimizing mechanism, call it Γ 2 (I), is defined by
This mechanism is incentive compatible due to the regularity conditions imposed in assumption 3. and as a direct consequence
Therefore, in absence of investment observability and buyer's commitment, the level of investment carried out by the first period winner, I, is the solution to
and the optimal mechanism chosen by the buyer corresponds to Γ 2 ( I).
Proof Proposition 19:
Remember the function
As before, assume that I satisfies the corresponding first order condition, that is V ( I) = 0. Since for every fixed c ∈ C the function I → J I (c) is strictly increasing (Lemma 9, (ii)) we have that
Moreover, because J I (c) > J(c) for all c ∈ C and I ≥ 0 (Lemma 9, (ii)), the regularity assumption
n−1 which leads to
Recalling that I e is such that
n−1 ∂G ∂I (c, I e )dc − Ψ (I e ) = 0, we conclude that I < I e using that In order to prove the proposition, we distinguish the following cases: (a) I (the investment level induced under non-commitment and investment observability) satisfies the first order condition of problem (19) and, (b) I does not satisfies the first order condition of problem (19). We consider first (a).
As we have discussed, if the investment level chosen by the first period winner was I, the buyer has as a dominant strategy to impose Γ(I), with Q This occurs because the negative effect due to [1 − F (J −1 (J I (c)))] n−1 , which is present in V 's behavior, does not appears in U . As a consequence, the first period winner has the incentive to invest more.
As L( I) = This is a maximum point since the function K → U ( I, K) is strictly concave in I (assumption 2). Then, the winner has the incentive to invest I, when facing the mechanism Γ( I). We have proved that ( I, Γ( I) is the unique pure strategy equilibrium in an interior solution of (19).
On the other hand, assume that (b) holds, that is, no investment level satisfies the first order condition of (19). The the previous reasonings and assumptions allow us to conclude that V (·) always decreases and, as a direct consequence, the investment level induced under non-commitment and investment observability is zero ( I = 0). Thus, we can no longer ensure the existence of a point I such that L( I) > 0, which was the main argument to show the existence of I. Therefore, we have two cases: (i) Exists I ≥ 0 such that L( I) > 0. In this case the existence and uniqueness of I is ensured using the same arguments as before. Also we have I < I because L(·) is strictly decreasing.
(ii) There is no I > 0 such that L(I) = 0. Because of (21), continuity and monotonicity of L(·) (decreasing), it must be that L(I) < 0 if I > 0, hence, L(0) ≤ 0. In this case (0, Γ(0)) is an equilibrium: when the winner makes no investment, the buyer has no incentive to deviate from Γ(0). On the other side, when facing this last mechanism, the first period winner has no incentive to invest because his marginal utility under this mechanism, L(0), is always negative. It is unique because L's monotonicity.
Note that in all the previous cases, I ≤ I, and strict inequality can be ensured if I satisfies the first order condition of (19). This concludes the proof.
Proof Corollary 23:
We only need to show that I < I e . Assume that I satisfies the first order condition of (20). It has been argued that Since I is such that L( I) = 0, applying the same arguments used in the previous results we can conclude that I < I e . Finally, if I does not satisfy the first order condition of (20), then, I = 0, and the result remains unchanged.
Proof Corollary 24: It is direct that the mechanisms under non-commitment (observable and nonobservable investment) are incentive compatible and ensure participation at t = 2 for all sellers. Also, the first period transfers are set-up such that participation at both competitions are ensured for all players, that is, under these mechanisms, is satisfied for all i ∈ N . Therefore, the optimal mechanisms under non-commitment (observable and non-observable investment) are feasible mechanisms under full commitment and investment observability. Thus, by optimality, the cost of both procurements in the case of full commitment is lower than the case of non-commitment (whether investment is observable or not).
Proof Proposition 25: For any investment level I, total expected costs corresponds to Integrating by parts,
